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As the effort to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
(RPA) systems continues, there is an increasing demand for improved total system 
performance; specifically, reduced mishap rates. The USAF MQ-1 and MQ-9 have 
produced lifetime mishap rates of 7.58 and 4.58 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours, 
respectively. To improve the understanding of RPA mishap epidemiology, an analysis 
was completed on USAF MQ-1 and MQ-9 RPA mishaps from 2006-2011. The dataset 
included 88 human error-related mishaps that were coded using the DoD Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System. The specific research question was: Do the types of 
active failures (unsafe acts) and latent failures (preconditions, unsafe supervision, and 
organizational influences) differ between the MQ-1 and MQ-9 when operated with the 
same Ground Control Station (GCS)? The single inclusion of Organizational Climate 
(organizational influence) in the Level II logistic regression model suggests that there is 
not a statistically significant difference in RPA-type mishaps with regard to human error. 
These results suggest that human performance requirements should be coupled to the 
GCS and not aircraft type. The models have the promise to inform RPA certification 
standards and future system designs. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. OVERVIEW .....................................................................................................1 
B. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................2 
1. The MQ-1Predator ..............................................................................2 
2. The MQ-9 Reaper ................................................................................3 
3. The Ground Control Station ...............................................................4 
C. OBJECTIVE ....................................................................................................5 
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................5 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................6 
F. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ..........................................................6 
1. Personnel ...............................................................................................7 
2. Human Factors Engineering ...............................................................8 
3. Occupational Health ............................................................................8 
4. Safety .....................................................................................................8 
G. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS ........................................................................9 
H. ORGANIZATION ...........................................................................................9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................................11 
A. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................11 
B. ACCIDENT CAUSATION THEORIES .....................................................12 
1. Simple Linear Accident Model (Domino Model) ............................12 
2. Complex Linear Accident Model (Swiss Cheese Model) ................13 
3. Non-Linear or Systemic Models .......................................................14 
C. DOD HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM .........................................................................................................14 
D. USAF MQ-1 AND MQ-9 MISHAPS ............................................................17 
E. USAF SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS ..........................................................19 
1. Mishap Categories .............................................................................20 
2. AFSAS .................................................................................................20 
III. RESEARCH METHOD ............................................................................................21 
A. APPROACH ...................................................................................................21 
B. DATABASE AND ACCIDENT CODING ..................................................21 
1. HFACS Coding...................................................................................21 
C. DATA ANALYSIS .........................................................................................23 
1. DOD HFACS Category Frequency ..................................................23 
2. Inter-Rater Reliability .......................................................................23 
3. Human Error Pattern Analysis ........................................................24 
IV. RESULTS ...................................................................................................................25 
A. ACCIDENT DATABASE .............................................................................25 
B. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY ..................................................................29 
1. HFACS Level I ...................................................................................29 
2. HFACS Level II..................................................................................30 
 viii 
C. HUMAN ERROR PATTERN ANALYSIS .................................................31 
1. HFACS Level I Analysis ....................................................................31 
2. HFACS Level II Analysis ..................................................................33 
D. LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS .....................................................35 
1. Covariate Analysis .............................................................................36 
2. Level I Analysis ..................................................................................37 
3. Level I Cross Validation ....................................................................41 
4. Level II Analysis .................................................................................43 
5. Level II Cross Validation ..................................................................48 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................52 
V. DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................55 
A. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................55 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION .............................................................................57 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEM DESIGN ................................................58 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................59 
APPENDIX A.  MQ-1 AND MQ-9 SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS .....................61 
APPENDIX B. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY SAMPLE SET ............................63 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................65 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. MQ-1 Predator (From U.S. Air Force, 2012) ....................................................3 
Figure 2. MQ-9 Reaper (From U.S. Air Force, 2012) .......................................................4 
Figure 3. Interior of the GCS for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 (From U.S. Air Force, 2012) ......5 
Figure 4. USAF RPA Training (After Taranto, 2012) ......................................................7 
Figure 5. Simple Linear Accident Model (From Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 
2006) ................................................................................................................12 
Figure 6. The Swiss Cheese Model (From Webster, White, & Wurmstein, 2005) .........13 
Figure 7. The Four Tiers of DoD HFACS (From Webster, White, & Wurmstein, 
2005) ................................................................................................................16 
Figure 8. MQ-1 Mishap History (From USAF, 2012). ...................................................18 
Figure 9. MQ-9 Mishap History (From USAF, 2012). ...................................................18 
Figure 10. Level I Inter-Rater Gauge Attribute Chart .......................................................29 
Figure 11. Level I Inter-Rater Reliability Kappa Coefficients ..........................................30 
Figure 12. Level II Inter-Rater Gauge Attribute Chart .....................................................30 
Figure 13. Level II Inter-Rater Reliability Kappa Coefficients ........................................31 
Figure 14. Level I HFACS Coding by RPA ......................................................................32 
Figure 15. Level II HFACS Coding by RPA ....................................................................33 
Figure 16. Level I Stepwise Fit Results for RPA ..............................................................38 
Figure 17. Level I Nominal Logistic Fit for RPA .............................................................39 
Figure 18. Level I Odds Ratio Results ..............................................................................40 
Figure 19. Level I ROC Curve ..........................................................................................41 
Figure 20. Level I Cross Validation Training Set Results ................................................42 
Figure 21. Level I Cross Validation Test Set Results .......................................................43 
Figure 22. Level II Stepwise Fit Results for RPA .............................................................45 
Figure 23. Level II Nominal Logistic Fit for RPA ............................................................46 
Figure 24. Level II Odds Ratio Results .............................................................................47 
Figure 25. Level II ROC Curve .........................................................................................48 
Figure 26. Level II Cross Validation Training Set Results ...............................................49 
Figure 27. Level II Cross Validation Test Set Results ......................................................50 
Figure 28. Level II Cross Validation Training Set Results (Second Iteration) .................51 
Figure 29. Level II Cross Validation Test Set Results (Second Iteration) ........................52 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. USAF Mishap Categories ................................................................................20 
Table 2. DoD HFACS Grouping....................................................................................22 
Table 3. RPA-Human Error Mishap Distribution ..........................................................25 
Table 4. Nanocodes Cited by RPA Type .......................................................................26 
Table 5. Mishaps by Class .............................................................................................26 
Table 6. Mishaps by Class and Nanocode .....................................................................27 
Table 7. Mishaps by Domain .........................................................................................27 
Table 8. Mishaps by Phase of Flight ..............................................................................28 
Table 9. Mishaps by Phase of Flight for Both RPA Types ............................................28 
Table 10. Level I Citing Frequency by RPA ...................................................................32 
Table 11. Level I Citing Frequency (Both) ......................................................................33 
Table 12. Level II Citing Frequency by RPA ..................................................................34 
Table 13. Level II Citing Frequency (Both) ....................................................................35 
Table 14. Summary of Covariate Chi-Square Tests ........................................................37 
Table 15. Summary of Level I Mishap Distribution ........................................................37 
Table 16. Summary of Level II Mishap Distribution.......................................................44 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A   Acts 
AE1   Skill-Based Errors 
AE2   Judgment and Decision-Making Errors 
AE3   Perception Errors 
AFB   Air Force Base 
AFI   Air Force Instruction 
AFMAN  Air Force Manual 
AFSAS  Air Force Safety Automated System 
AFSEC Air Force Safety Center 
AIC   Akaike Information Criterion 
AV   Violations 
CAS   Close Air Support 
CSAR    Combat Search and Rescue 
DoD   Department of Defense 
FAA   Federal Aviation Administration 
FY   Fiscal Year 
GCS Ground Control Station 
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
HFE    Human Factors Engineering 
HPW   Human Performance Wing 
HSI   Human Systems Integration 
IRB   Institution Review Board 
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
MALE   Medium Altitude Long Endurance 
MQ Multi-Role Unmanned Aircraft 
Mx   Maintenance 
O   Organizational Influences 
OC   Organizational Climate 
 xiv 
OP   Organizational Processes 
Ops   Operations 
OR   Resource/Acquisition Management 
OSD   Office of the Secretary of Defense 
P   Preconditions 
PC1   Cognitive Factors 
PC2   Psycho-Behavioral Factors 
PC3   Adverse Physiological States 
PC4   Physical/Mental Limitations 
PC5   Perceptual Factors 
PE1   Physical Environment 
PE2   Technological Environment 
PP1   Coordination/Communication/Planning Factors 
PP2   Self-Imposed Stress 
ROC   Receiver Operating Characteristic 
RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
S   Supervision 
SEF   Flight Safety 
SF   Failure to Correct Known Problem 
SI   Inadequate Supervision 
SP   Planned Inappropriate Operations 
SUPT   Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training 
SV   Supervisory Violations 
TST   Time Sensitive Targets 
UAS   Unmanned Aircraft System 





Human error continues to plague military aviation well into the 21st century and does not 
appear to discriminate between manned or unmanned aircraft systems. Historical analysis 
provides evidence that human error is identified as a causal factor in 80 to 90 percent of 
aviation mishaps, and is therefore the single greatest threat to flight safety. The dramatic 
increase in Combatant Commanders‟ requests for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 
systems during the last decade, in addition to the rapidly growing civilian RPA sector, is 
evidence that these systems are becoming an integral component to our national defense 
and numerous civil aeronautics sectors. 
Along with the rapid increase in RPA use, a high mishap rate has followed. The 
cost associated with human error-related RPA mishaps is significant. RPAs provide a 
unique challenge to developers of certification standards (e.g., FAA) because the cockpit, 
also referred to as the ground control station (GCS), and the aircraft are separate and it is 
theoretically possible to mix and match GCS‟ and aircraft. So what matters in terms of 
human performance: the GCS or the aircraft? This question is a significant point of 
debate in policy and worthy of analysis. As such, adequate incorporation of Human 
Systems Integration early in the system acquisition phases is dependent on quantitative 
and relevant data to serve as forcing functions in designing and building smart human-
centered systems that optimize total system performance. 
The analysis and understanding of where human error contributes to RPA 
mishaps is lacking in the current literature. In an effort to improve the understanding of 
RPA mishap epidemiology, an analysis was completed on USAF MQ-1 and MQ-9 RPA 
mishaps from 2006–2011. The dataset provided the opportunity to gain insight into this 
question as a natural experiment in which the GCS is controlled and the aircraft is varied. 
The pattern of human performance failures provide evidence supporting the development 
of aircraft certification standards or the standards on the GCS used in the RPA system. 
The dataset included 88 human error-related mishaps that were coded using DoD Human 
Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS), an evolution of Reason‟s (1990) 
complex linear accident model, known as the Swiss Cheese Model. The MQ-1 and MQ-9 
 xvi 
are the premier operational RPA systems for the USAF and are highly valued operational 
assets. The aircraft have different flight characteristics but are controlled using the same 
GCS. Do the types of active failures (unsafe acts) and latent failures (preconditions, 
unsafe supervision, and organizational influences) differ between the MQ-1 and MQ-9 
when operated with the same GCS? The present analysis of the human error data sheds 
light on that issue. 
Human error coding was assigned by the original mishap investigators and was 
validated by conducting inter-rater reliability analyses of the mishaps. The moderate to 
good agreement identified between Rater 1 (original mishap investigator) and Raters 2 
(aerospace medicine specialist) and 3 (aerospace physiologist) provided sufficient 
evidence to support validation of the study dataset. 
The initial exploration of the data involved the organization of the data into two 
levels of the DoD HFACS hierarchy, Level I (Acts, Preconditions, Supervision, 
Organization) and Level II (20 subcategories of Level I), referred to as categories of 
nanocodes. Covariates evaluated in the dataset included Phase of Flight (Ground 
Operations, Takeoff, Climb, Enroute, Landing, and Other), Mishap Domain (Operations, 
Logistics/Maintenance, and Miscellaneous), and Mishap Class (A, B, and C) by RPA 
type. The application of chi-square tests to evaluate the observed and expected 
frequencies at both Levels for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 provided statistical rationale for 
selecting nanocodes and covariates for inclusion in the logistic regression analysis. The 
analysis at Level I did not identify any latent or active failures, as defined in DoD 
HFACS, for inclusion in the model. The analysis at Level I suggests that the binary 
response variable (RPA type) was not associated with human error (DoD HFACS). The 
Level II results of the logistic regression are consistent with the results from Level I and 
included only one DoD HFACS category, Organizational Climate. The analyses rejected 
the hypothesis that there is an effect of human performance concerns on RPA type  while 
operating RPA systems with the same GCS. These results provide additional evidence 
that human performance requirements need to be closely coupled to the GCS and not 
necessarily to the aircraft type. Current and future RPA systems should consider and 
 xvii 
prioritize the impact of GCS design, policy, and procedures with regard to RPA total 
system performance. 
The unique patterns, or lack thereof, of human performance failures provide 
evidence supporting the development of GCS standards used in RPA systems. Further 
exploration and analysis must be accomplished to transition to a more comprehensive 
understanding of human error-related RPA mishap patterns. By using the analysis in the 
present research, the USAF may be able to develop effective system design strategies 
with the objective to reduce the growing cost of these mishaps. The efforts presented in 
this study have contributed to the understanding of this relatively new realm in aviation 
history, the RPA. 
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A primary technique for evaluating fielded systems is to analyze historical 
mishaps. This study is a quantitative analysis of the distribution of human error in six 
years (2006–2011) of mishap data involving Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) within the 
United States Air Force (USAF). The archival data on mishaps involving USAF RPA 
was provided by the Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC) to the student author for this 
thesis. The data set consists of codes generated by mishap investigation teams using the 
DoD Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). HFACS provides a 
hierarchical approach to identifying the root cause of mishaps. The archival nature of the 
data set afforded a quasi-experimental study of two USAF RPA airframes, the MQ-1 
Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper. This thesis analyzed these data to identify patterns of 
human error by airframe type and developed guidance for designing safer systems. 
The MQ-1 and MQ-9 are the premier operational RPAs for the USAF and are 
highly valued operational assets. The aircraft have different flight characteristics but are 
controlled using the same Ground Control Station (GCS). Is the same GCS appropriate 
for such different aircraft? The analysis of the human error data sheds light on that issue. 
Current and future RPA systems must consider the impact of brittle engineering 
on the ability of an individual and/or an aircraft to conduct sense making, and ultimately 
understand the path to returning to dynamic stability. This thesis reviews human 
performance in such environments, and recommends a solution aimed at proactive 
mishap prevention. This study explored the potential human error patterns in the USAF 
MQ-1 and MQ-9 communities, and recommends a solution aimed at proactive mishap 
prevention. New technologies have been introduced with the intent that they will 
eliminate known issues, only to find that the potential for new error types has been 
overlooked, and that new error may be worse than those being eliminated (Hollnagel, 
Woods, & Leveson, 2006). 
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The many complex factors that exist within the context of RPA operations are 
dynamic and interdependent. The fragile tension within the envelope of human 
performance provides clear boundaries that define constraints that must be met to ensure 
the safety of flight. As aircraft technology has advanced, RPA have provided increasingly 
impressive capabilities. With the addition of the MQ-9, different ingredients for human 
performance threats may have been introduced into the system.  
The cost associated with human error-related RPA mishaps is significant. Future 
system designs need to incorporate the identified patterns of human error as seen in 
historical mishaps to improve the total system performance of future RPA systems. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. The MQ-1Predator 
The Predator RPA system, shown in Figure 1, was designed in response to a DoD 
requirement to provide the warfighter with persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) information combined with a kill capability. In April 1996, the 
Secretary of Defense selected the USAF as the operating service for the RQ-1 Predator 
system. The “R” is the DoD designation for reconnaissance, and “Q” means Unmanned 
Aircraft System (UAS). The “1” refers to the aircraft being the first of the series of RPA 
systems. A change in designation from “RQ-1” to “MQ-1” occurred in 2002. The “M” is 
the DoD designation for multi-role, reflecting the addition of the capabilities to carry 
Hellfire missiles and to fire them autonomously. The MQ-1 provides armed ISR 
capabilities to overseas contingency operations. In August 2011, the MQ-1 passed a 
major milestone- one million total operating hours, a significant accomplishment for the 
USAF. The system characteristics are shown in Appendix A (U.S. Air Force, 2012a). 
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Figure 1.  MQ-1 Predator (From U.S. Air Force, 2012) 
The MQ-1 Predator is an armed, multi-mission, medium-altitude, long endurance 
(MALE) RPA that is employed primarily in a killer/scout role as an intelligence 
collection asset and secondarily against dynamic execution targets. Given its significant 
loiter time, wide-range sensors, multi-mode communications suite, and precision 
weapons, it provides the capability to execute the kill chain (find, fix, track, target, 
engage, and assess) against high-value, fleeting, and time-sensitive targets (TSTs) 
autonomously. The MQ-1 also can perform the following missions and tasks: ISR, close 
air support (CAS), combat search and rescue (CSAR), precision strike, buddy-lase, 
convoy/raid overwatch, route clearance, target development, and terminal air guidance. 
The MQ-1's capabilities qualify it to conduct irregular warfare operations. 
2. The MQ-9 Reaper 
The USAF proposed the MQ-9 Reaper system, shown in Figure 2, in response to 
the DoD direction to support overseas contingency operations. It is larger and more 
powerful than the MQ-1. It is capable of flying higher, faster, and farther than the MQ-1. 
Like the MQ-1, it is designed to prosecute time-sensitive targets with persistence and 
precision, and to destroy or disable those targets. The “9” indicates it is the ninth in the 
series of remotely piloted aircraft systems. The system characteristics are shown in 
Appendix A (U.S. Air Force, 2012b). 
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Figure 2.  MQ-9 Reaper (From U.S. Air Force, 2012) 
The MQ-9 is an armed, multi-mission MALE RPA that is employed primarily in a 
hunter/killer role against dynamic execution targets and secondarily as an intelligence 
collection asset. Given its significant loiter time, wide-range sensors, multi-mode 
communications suite, and precision weapons, it provides a capability to execute the kill 
chain (find, fix, track, target, execute, and assess) against high value, fleeting TSTs 
autonomously.  
The MQ-9 also can perform the following missions and tasks: ISR, CAS, CSAR, 
precision strike, buddy-laser, convoy/raid overwatch, route clearance, target 
development, and terminal air guidance. The MQ-9's capabilities qualify it to conduct 
irregular warfare operations. 
3. The Ground Control Station  
The GCS for both the MQ-1 and the MQ-9 is shown in Figure 3. The GCS is a 
self-contained operations center that includes seats, computers, keyboards, screens, flight 




Figure 3.  Interior of the GCS for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 (From U.S. Air Force, 2012) 
C. OBJECTIVE 
RPAs provide a unique challenge to developers of certification standards 
 (e.g., FAA) because the GCS and the aircraft are separate and it is theoretically possible 
to mix and match GCS‟ and aircraft. So what matters in terms of human performance: the 
GCS or the aircraft? This question is a significant point of debate in policy and worthy of 
analysis. 
The dataset provided the opportunity to gain insight into this question as a natural 
experiment in which the GCS is controlled and the aircraft is varied. The pattern of 
human performance failures provide evidence supporting the development of aircraft 
certification standards or GCS standards used in the RPA system.  
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The use of the same GCS to control both the MQ-1 and MQ-9 aircraft creates an 
opportunity to explore and identify the human factors issues underlying RPA safety. The 
study identifies mishap issues that are unique to each aircraft and those that are shared by 
both. The analysis focuses on characteristics of the aircraft and their missions and on how 
these factors may define patterns of human performance failures. 
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E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research is driven by the need to improve the understanding of human 
performance patterns in the realm of RPA operations. The specific research question is: 
Do the types of active failures (unsafe acts) and latent failures (preconditions, unsafe 
supervision, and organizational influences) differ between the MQ-1 and MQ-9 when 
operated with the same GCS? The research analyzed the archive of HFACS data to 
identify human factors issues that are unique to each aircraft and those that are shared by 
both. It developed logistic regression models to predict aircraft type given the HFACS 
coding scheme (discussed in Chapter II). The models have the promise to inform RPA 
certification standards and future system designs. 
F. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Air Force Instruction 63-1201, Life Cycle Systems Engineering, defines Human 
Systems Integration as a disciplined, unified, and interactive systems engineering 
approach to integrate human considerations into system development, design, and life 
cycle management to improve total system performance and reduce costs of ownership. 






 Occupational Health 
 Human Factors Engineering 
 Survivability 
 Habitability  
This section discusses how the research in this thesis impacts four domains of 
HSI. Several of the HSI domains are involved in any human error mishap. This study 
impacts Personnel, Human Factors Engineering (HFE), Occupational Health, and Safety 
within the USAF RPA community. 
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1. Personnel 
Personnel considers the type of human knowledge, skills, abilities, experience 
levels, and human aptitudes required to operate, maintain, and support a system; and the 
means to provide such people. Personnel recruitment, testing, qualification, and selection 
are driven by system requirements (USAF HSI Office, 2009). 
The USAF began filling RPA manpower billets with rated fighter pilots during 
the initial phases of the RPA mission. Most of the initial cadre migrated from the F-16 
and F-15 communities. Following an increase in pilot demand, the USAF began selecting 
RPA pilots from Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) upon completion of 
manned flight school. As the demand continued to increase, the USAF developed an 
independent career field (18X) and a formal training pipeline. The RPA pilot pipeline is 
shown in Figure 4 (Taranto, 2012). RPA pilots must complete about 140 hours of 
academics for RPA instrument qualification at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB). 
Additionally, they must pass seven tests and accomplish 36 missions on T-6 simulators 
during 48 hours of training. Once they complete instrument qualification, the students 
move on to the four-week RPA fundamentals course, also at Randolph AFB. They then 
move to the basic qualifications course at Creech AFB, NV or Holloman AFB, NM. In 
all, the RPA pilot pipeline takes approximately one year to complete. 
 














•Daily Fitness for 
Duty 
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2. Human Factors Engineering 
HFE involves understanding and comprehensive integration of human capabilities 
(cognitive, physical, sensory, and team dynamic) into system design. A major concern for 
HFE is creating integration of human-system interfaces to achieve optimal total system 
performance (USAF HSI Office, 2009). 
The evolution of RPA technology and integration into USAF operations has 
increased military capabilities. As with most new systems, known and unknown trade-
offs for both the human and the system occur spanning the entire lifecycle. In the case of 
RPA operations, human performance boundaries and limitations may have been 
unintentionally exceeded. Further, the potential for RPA specific mismatches between 
system design and operator training and capabilities may exist. While these advanced 
systems are very attractive, inevitable gaps in the system design are likely to exist 
between work as imagined and work as practiced. Anything that obscures this gap will 
make it impossible for the organization (or system) to calibrate its understanding or 
model itself and thereby undermine processes of learning and improvement (Hollnagel, 
Woods, & Leveson, 2006).  
3. Occupational Health 
Occupational Health promotes system design features that serve to minimize the 
risk of injury, acute or chronic illness, disability, and enhance the job performance of 
personnel who operate, maintain, or support the system (USAF HSI Office, 2009).  
RPAs provide a unique challenge to developers of certification standards (e.g., 
FAA) because the cockpit and the aircraft are separate and it is theoretically possible to 
mix and match GCS‟ and aircraft. The pattern of human performance failures provide 
evidence supporting the development of aircraft certification standards or the standards 
on the GCS used in the RPA system. 
4. Safety 
Safety promotes system design characteristics and procedures to minimize the 
potential for accidents or mishaps that: cause death or injury to operators, maintainers, 
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and support personnel; threaten the operation of the system; or cause cascading failures in 
other systems. Using safety analyses and lessons learned from predecessor systems, the 
Safety community prompts design features to prevent safety hazards where possible and 
to manage safety hazards that cannot be avoided. The focus is on designs that have back-
up systems, and, where an interface with humans exists, to alert them when problems 
arise and also to help to avoid and recover from errors (USAF HSI Office, 2009).  
G. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Although mishaps related to human error are a systemic problem throughout the 
DoD, this research focuses on the USAF MQ-1 and MQ-9 human error-related mishaps 
from 2006-2011. 
H. ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter II 
describes a review of the applicable literature, while Chapter III outlines the 
methodological approach of research. Chapter IV describes the results of the researcher‟s 
analysis and findings, and Chapter V describes the conclusions and recommendations.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of human error, accident causation, DoD 
HFACS, and USAF RPA human error-related mishaps. The literature review consisted of 
published papers, research reports, and publications written by human factors 
professionals. 
Human error continues to plague military aviation. Analysis provides evidence 
that human error is identified as a causal factor in 80 to 90 percent of mishaps, and is 
therefore the single greatest mishap hazard. Further, it is well established that mishaps are 
rarely attributed to a single cause, or in most instances, even a single individual. The goal 
of a mishap or event investigation is to identify these failures and conditions in order to 
understand why the mishap occurred and how it might be prevented from happening 
again (Webster, White, & Wurmstein, 2005). 
The DoD HFACS categorizations of human error have been completed following 
mishaps, where the outcome is identified and the human operator is assigned the blame 
(Salmon, Regan, & Johnston, 2005). Rasmussen‟s view was that if the system performs 
less satisfactorily because of a human act, then it is likely human error (Rasmussen, 
1986). In contrast, Woods (2006) describes the labeling of “human error” as prejudicial. 
Using “human error” hides much more than it reveals about how a system functions or 
malfunctions (Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, & Starter, 2010). This study accepts 
Reason‟s definition of an error: a symptom that reveals the presence of latent conditions 
in the system at large (Reason, 1997). 
The word “error” is often vaguely used to describe action or inaction on part of 
the human. A clear understanding of the definition for the purposes of this study is 
consistent with that of Reason. Error is split into two main categories: errors and 
violations. Violations differ in that they are considered intentional acts (Reason, 1990). 
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B. ACCIDENT CAUSATION THEORIES 
The various perceptions of the accident phenomenon are what present day 
terminology call “accident models.” The genesis of these models was single-factor 
models, e.g., accident proneness (Greenwood & Woods, 1919). These models developed 
from simple and complex linear causation models to present-day systemic and functional 
resonance models.  
1. Simple Linear Accident Model (Domino Model) 
The archetype and most commonly known simple linear model is Heinrich‟s 
(1931) Domino model, which uses linear propagation of a chain of causes and effects to 
explain accidents (Figure 5). The focus of the Domino model is that accidents are the 
result of a sequence of events. He viewed the dominos as unsafe conditions or unsafe 
acts, where their respective removal would prevent a chain reaction from propagating, 
thus preventing the accident. This model is associated with one of the first attempts at 
formulating a comprehensive safety theory. This view suggests that accidents are 
basically disturbances inflicted on an otherwise stable system. While this model has been 
highly useful by providing a concrete approach to understanding accidents, it has also 
reinforced the misunderstanding that accidents have a root cause and that this root cause 
can be identified by simply working backwards from the event through the chain of 
events that precede it (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006). 
 
Figure 5.  Simple Linear Accident Model (From Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) 
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2. Complex Linear Accident Model (Swiss Cheese Model) 
The well-known Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1990) is an archetype complex 
linear accident model. Reason‟s model focuses on the structure or hierarchy of the 
organization to illustrate how a mishap or accident can occur. According to this model, 
accidents can be seen as the result of interrelations between real time “„unsafe acts‟” by 
the operator and “„latent conditions‟” upstream in the hierarchy. The hierarchical layers 
of defense are the “„cheese‟”. The unsafe acts and latent conditions are the holes in the 
“„cheese‟” (Figure 6).  
The Swiss Cheese Model suggests that a layered defense would not have any 
holes, forming a blockade that prevents any hazards that may lead to an accident. The 
breakdown of the conspicuous defenses comprises the components of risk and failures. 
With this model, causality is not considered a single linear propagation of effects; it is 
still the result of precipitating events and the failure of a barriers still the failure of an 
individual component (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006). Complex linear models, 
such as the Swiss Cheese Model, are designed to describe how coincidences occur, but 
are bound to a rigid, hierarchic structure that fails to account for dynamic relations 
between agents, host, barriers and environments. Many accidents defy the explanatory 
ability of these complex linear models. More sophisticated explanations are required. 
 
Figure 6.  The Swiss Cheese Model (From Webster, White, & Wurmstein, 2005) 
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3. Non-Linear or Systemic Models 
Authors, researchers, and investigators have concluded that accidents can be due 
to an unexpected combination or aggregation of conditions or events know as 
concurrence. The acknowledgement that two or more events happening at the same time 
can affect each other has led to the development of non-linear “„systemic models.‟” 
These models focus on the non-linear phenomena that emerge in a complex system. This 
perspective admits that variability in system performance is influenced by both 
constituent subsystems and the operating environment, that is, by both endogenous and 
exogenous variability, respectively. The systemic model selects a functional point of 
view where resilience is an organization‟s or system‟s ability to adequately adjust to 
destabilizing influences. The strength of resilience comes from the ability to adapt and 
adjust rather than the power to resist or blockade. A dangerous state may evolve due to 
system adjustments being inadequate or wrong, rather than due to “„human error‟” or 
failure. This perspective views failure as the flip side of success, and therefore a normal 
phenomenon (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006). 
C. DOD HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
A taxonomy called DoD HFACS has been developed and is used to characterize 
the root causes of mishaps. HFACS draws upon Reason's (1990) Swiss Cheese Model of 
system failure and Wiegmann and Shappell‟s (2003) concept of active failures and latent 
failures/conditions. It describes the four tiers of failures/conditions shown in Figure 7. 
Wiegmann and Shappell created a taxonomy of codes that define various aspects of 
human error that may lead to mishaps. These classification codes are termed 
“„nanocodes‟” (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). 
As described by Reason (1990), active failures are the actions or inactions of 
operators that are believed to cause the mishap. Traditionally referred to as “„error,”‟ they 
are the last “acts” committed by individuals, often with immediate and devastating 
consequences. For example, an aviator forgetting to lower the landing gear before touch 
down will have relatively immediate, and potentially grave, consequences. In contrast, 
latent failures or conditions are errors that exist within the organization or elsewhere in 
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the supervisory chain of command that affect the sequence of events of a mishap. For 
example, it is not difficult to understand how tasking crews or teams at the expense of 
quality crew rest can lead to fatigue and ultimately to errors (active failures) in the 
cockpit. Viewed from this perspective, the actions of individuals are the end result of a 
chain of factors originating in other parts (often the upper echelons) of the organization. 
Unfortunately, these latent failures or conditions may lie dormant or undetected for some 
period of time prior to their manifestation as a mishap (Webster, White, & Wurmstein, 
2005). 
DoD HFACS describes four levels at which active failures and latent 
failures/conditions may occur within complex operations (Figure 7). DoD HFACS is 
particularly useful in mishap investigation because it forces investigators to address latent 
failures and conditions within the causal sequence of events. DoD HFACS does not stop 




Figure 7.  The Four Tiers of DoD HFACS (From Webster, White, & Wurmstein, 2005) 
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According to AFI 91-204 paragraph A5.1., the USAF requires the use of DoD HFACS as 
described in this excerpt: 
The DoD Instruction directs DoD components to “Establish procedures to 
provide for the cross-feed of human error data using a common human 
error categorization system that involves human factors taxonomy 
accepted among the DoD Components and U.S. Coast Guard.” All 
investigators who report and analyze DoD mishaps will use DoD 
HFACS. Human Factors is not just about humans. It is about how features 
of people‟s tools, tasks and working environment systemically influence 
human performance. This model is designed to present a systematic, 
multidimensional approach to error analysis. (USAF/SEF, 2008)  
D. USAF MQ-1 AND MQ-9 MISHAPS 
As the effort to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of RPA systems 
continues, there is an increasing demand for improved total system performance; 
specifically reduced mishap rates. The dramatic increase in Combatant Commander‟s 
requests for these mission critical systems during the last decade, in addition to the 
rapidly growing civilian RPA sector, it is evident these systems are becoming an integral 
component to our national defense and numerous civil aeronautics sectors. Along with 
the rapid increase in RPA use, a high mishap rate has followed. The USAF MQ-1 has 
produced a lifetime mishap rate of 7.58 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours (Figure 8) and 
the USAF MQ-9 is currently at 4.58 per 100,000 flight hours (Figure 9). While these 
rates have been reduced significantly in the last several years, there is still room for 
improved performance. The USAF fighter aircraft rate is typically between one and two 
mishaps per 100,000 flight hours and general aviation boasts a rate of only 1 mishap per 
100,000 flight hours.  
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Figure 8.  MQ-1 Mishap History (From USAF, 2012). 
 
Figure 9.  MQ-9 Mishap History (From USAF, 2012). 
Results from a recent study including 221 DoD RPA mishaps spanning a 10-year 
period found that 79 percent of USAF RPA mishaps were human error-related 
(Tvaryanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006). The DoD demonstrated a human error rate 
of 60 percent in the same study. Air Force Col. Anthony Tvaryanas stated that “If you 
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really wanted to make a dent in preventing RPA accidents, the DoD needs to look at how 
they do RPA systems acquisition” (Defense Daily, 2005). He suggests that the human 
error problem in the RPA community originates before the systems take off on the first 
mission. He also suggests that the decisions made early on in RPA development likely 
played a crucial role in the mishap rates. Fielding systems without fully developed 
requirements; incomplete testing; and buying cheaper components all contribute to the 
higher mishap rates. In a rush to field RPAs, the services failed to adequately weigh the 
Human Systems Integration issues that affect RPA total system performance (Defense 
Daily, 2005).  
The unprecedented success with regard to the absence of physical human injury 
associated with RPA operations is a positive outcome of the system. The current and 
foreseeable DoD fiscal climate suggests that there are still significant reasons for 
concern. According to two reports by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), “the 
reliability and sustainability of RPAs is vitally important because it underlines their 
affordability (and acquisition concern), their mission availability (an operations and 
logistics concern), and their acceptance into civil airspace (an FAA regulatory concern)”. 
Additionally, a Defense Scientific Advisory Board effort on RPAs issued in February 
2004 identified “high mishap rates” as one of the largest threats to RPA potential ( as 
cited in Tyvaryanas, 2006). 
E. USAF SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS 
A mishap is an unplanned occurrence or series of occurrences that results in 
damage or injury and meets Class A, B, C, or D mishap reporting criteria as defined by 
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-204 and Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 91-223. All 
mishaps require a safety investigation and report. The USAF conducts safety 
investigations for all reportable aircraft events to prevent future mishaps. These reports 
take priority over any corresponding legal investigations.  
The Air Force categorizes mishaps based upon the material involved (e.g., space 
systems, weapons, aircraft, motor vehicles, person, etc.) and the state of the involved 
material (e.g., launch, orbit, existence of intent for flight, on- or off-duty, etc.) when the 
mishap occurs (USAF/SEF, 2008). 
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1. Mishap Categories 
Aircraft Flight: Any mishap in which there is intent for flight and reportable 
damage to a DoD aircraft. As shown in Table 1, USAF uses thresholds measured in 
dollars to define three categories of mishaps. The dollar amounts increased in FY2010 
(USAF/SEF, 2008). The data set provided by the Air Force Safety Automated System 
(AFSAS) records the category for each mishap. 
Table 1.   USAF Mishap Categories 
 
*NOTE: The dollar amounts changed in FY2010 to $2,000,000 (Class A), 
$500,000–$1,000,000 (Class B), $50,000–$500,000 (Class C). 
2. AFSAS 
AFSAS is a web-based program that provides a mishap reporting capability for all 
safety disciplines throughout the U.S. Air Force. This system provides a reporting, 
analysis and trending capability and maintains a comprehensive Air Force safety 
database. This database enables the AFSEC to respond rapidly to both internal and 
external customer requests for mishap and safety data (Air Force Safety Center, 2012). 
Mishap reporting requires a written narrative be included in the final report and 
uploaded into AFSAS. The narrative provides important qualitative and quantitative 
information from which a majority of the DoD HFACS coding can be mapped. The 
author validated that the mapping accuracy of the reported HFACS codes to their mishap 
narratives by selecting a random subset of the reports and applying individual expert 
evaluation by coding each mishap and comparing the results using a Cohen‟s Kappa. 
Class A Class B Class C
Direct mishap cost totaling 
$1,000,000 or more
Direct mishap cost totaling 
$200,000 or more but less 
than $1,000,000
Direct mishap cost totaling 
$20,000 or more but less 
than $200,000
A fatality or permanent total 
disability
A permanent partial 
disability
Any injury or occupational 
illness or disease that 
causes loss of one or more 
days away from work 
beyond the day or shift it 
occurred
Inpatient hospitalization of 
three or more personnel
Mishap Type
 21 
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. APPROACH 
This study protocol was reviewed and approved by the 711 HPW/IR (AFRL IRB) 
in accordance with 32 CFR 219, DoDD 3216.2, and AFI-40-402 and by the Naval 
Postgraduate School Operations Research Department thesis approval process. The IRB 
determined that this study was exempt and considered not to be Human Subjects 
Research. The study design was a quantitative analysis of DoD HFACS nanocodes for six 
years of RPA mishap data. The inclusion criteria for this study were USAF MQ-1 and 
MQ-9 mishaps occurring during fiscal years 2006-2011 that resulted in more than 
$20,000 in damage. The data were retrieved from AFSAS under a formal request from 
the 711
th
 Human Performance Wing (HPW) for the purpose of this research. The author 
was granted an AFSAS account for the purposes of validating all HFACS nanocodes 
assigned by the investigators. This effort was assisted by Col. Anthony Tvaryanas of the 
711
th
 HPW to ensure a balanced and non-biased validation pursuant to DoD HFACS 
instructions. Additional information in the dataset include relevant parameters such as 
Phase of Flight, Mishap Domain (Logistics/Maintenance, Miscellaneous, and 
Operations), and Mishap Class (A, B, and C) by airframe and year. Some of the mishaps 
were determined not to be human error-related. In total, 88 mishaps were extracted for 
analysis. 
B. DATABASE AND ACCIDENT CODING 
1. HFACS Coding 
The raw data were produced and validated by three separate raters; all USAF 
officers (the assigned investigator, an aerospace medicine specialist, and an aerospace 
physiologist) who analyzed each mishap independently and classified each human causal 
factor using the DoD HFACS associated nanocodes. The investigator was likely different 
for each event. Following the coding, inter-rater reliability was calculated using Cohen‟s 
Kappa. During the validation effort, databases were constructed using Excel and 
statistical software package JMP Pro10. Cohen‟s Kappa, Chi-square, and binary logistic 
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regression tests were conducted to identify significant human error patterns. The 
nanocodes were the predictor variables in the logistic regression analyses and aircraft 
type, MQ-1 or MQ-9, were the binary response variable. A stepwise comparison was 
executed on the nanocodes and covariates to identify statistically significant variables for 
each RPA type and thus constructed models for predicting mishap RPA type. 
The DoD HFACS were applied at the nanocode level during the investigation and 
validation phases. Due to historically poor inter-rater reliability at the nanocode level 
(Level III), the DoD HFACS nanocodes were considered at the top two levels (Level I 
and II). Table 2 illustrates the organization of HFACS at these levels. Level I is divided 
into Acts, Preconditions, Supervision, and Organizational Influences. Level II groups the 
Level III nanocodes into 20 different Level II subcategories. 




C. DATA ANALYSIS 
1. DOD HFACS Category Frequency 
The frequency of occurrence for the DoD HFACS categories was evaluated for 
each of the mishaps within the dataset. The presence of a DoD HFACS nanocode was 
annotated with a one (1) and the absence of a nanocode was annotated with a zero (0). No 
code was used more than once in any mishap. The codes were used to determine how 
often the categories were used in the mishap dataset. The resulting database was analyzed 
using a Cohen‟s Kappa to determine inter-rater reliability and was the foundation for the 
logistic regression to construct the models. 
2. Inter-Rater Reliability 
A Cohen‟s Kappa analysis and evaluation was conducted to quantify inter-rater 
reliability among the three raters. The Kappa coefficient is noted as the preferred 
statistical measurement for determining agreement or disagreement between raters 
(Ubersax, 1987). It enables identification of statistically significant disagreements 
between any of the raters within the dataset. Cohen‟s Kappa was utilized to measure the 
proportion of agreement versus alignment by chance between each of the three different 
pairs of raters. 
A value of +1.0 indicates 100 percent agreement between the two raters. A kappa 
value of 0 means there is not a relationship between the two raters, while a kappa of –1.0 
is considered to be a 100 percent disagreement. Additional interpretations of the values 
were defined as follows (Curdy, 2009): 
 between 0.8 and 1 is considered Very Good 
 between 0.6 and 0.8 is considered Good 
 between 0.4 and 0.6 is considered Moderate Agreement 
 between 0.2 and 0.4 is considered Fair Agreement 
 between 0 and 0.2 is considered Slight Agreement 
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3. Human Error Pattern Analysis 
Following the validation efforts, a pattern analysis was conducted to identify the 
most prevalent causal factors. Logistic regression and the chi-square test were applied to 
the data to examine the hypothesis among the MQ-1 and MQ-9 mishaps at Level I and II 
in the DoD HFACS hierarchy. The logistic regression was applied at both levels of 
dichotomous coded variables (HFACS nanocodes). From this prospective, the response 
variable can be considered to have a probability between zero and one. The data consist 
of individual records (mishap nanocodes) that were classified as a success or failure (1 or 
0. All nominal covariates with k levels were coded using k-1 dummy variables. 
In searching for potentially important covariates, a univariate regression model 
for each nanocode and covariate was created. Those with p-values less than 0.25 were 
deemed close enough to be included in subsequent iterations. Those with p-values greater 
than 0.25 are unlikely to be important and may be safely discarded. Chi-square analysis 
was conducted at each level followed by a full logistic regression analysis. A stepwise 
regression was conducted in an effort to fit and select a feasible model. The Odds Ratios 
were calculated to measure the effect size and to describe the strength of association 
between the data. Model validation was completed using the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curve to show the tradeoff between successfully identifying True 
Positive values and mistakenly identifying False Positives. Cross-Validation was 
performed to assess how well the model classifies records outside of the data. This 
process provides a sense of the fit of the model and was executed by assigning training 




A. ACCIDENT DATABASE 
The initial dataset contained a total of 149 USAF Class A, B, and C MQ-1 and 
MQ-9 mishap reports from fiscal years 2006-2011. Of the 149 reports, DoD HFACS was 
applied to 88 (59.1 percent) and were events considered to be related to human error 
suitable for inclusion in the study. The remaining 61 mishap reports were verified to be 
events that were not related to human error. Table 3 presents the distribution of mishaps 
by RPA type and human factors applicability with associated rates. The percentage of 
human error mishaps was not statistically different across RPA type (χ 2(1) = 0.021, p = 
0.886). 
Table 3.   RPA-Human Error Mishap Distribution 
 
A total of 573 DOD HFACS nanocodes were cited by the mishap investigators in 
the 88 mishaps. The number of mishap reports by RPA type and respective HFACS 
codes are listed in Table 4. The MQ-1 and MQ-9 averaged 6.4 and 6.9 nanocodes per 
mishap respectively. The number of nanocodes per mishap is not statistically different 
across RPA type (χ 2(1) = 0.764, p = 0.090). 
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Table 4.   Nanocodes Cited by RPA Type 
 
The dataset was categorized by USAF mishap classification (Class A, B, and C) 
and is presented in Table 5. The MQ-1 breakdown showed there were 46 (66.7 percent) 
Class A mishaps, 11 (15.9 percent) Class B mishaps, and 12 (17.4 percent) Class C 
mishaps. The MQ-9 breakdown showed there were nine (47.4 percent) Class A mishaps, 
five (26.3 percent) Class B mishaps, and five (26.3 percent) Class C mishaps. The 
distribution of mishaps across class is not statistically different (χ 2(2) = 2.384, p = 
0.304). In the logistic regression analysis, this polychotomous variable was coded with 
two dummy variables that assigned Class C as the baseline. All FY 2010 and 2011 
mishaps were evaluated for actual cost and were categorized as defined by pre-FY 2010 
dollar amounts as listed in Table 1 to standardize the data. In total, five Class C mishaps 
were re-categorized as Class B mishaps and five Class B mishaps were re-categorized as 
Class A mishaps for the purpose of data standardization. 
Table 5.   Mishaps by Class 
 
Additionally, the distribution of mishaps by nanocodes was analyzed and found to 
be statistically different across RPA type (χ 2(2) = 11.144, p = 0.0038), as shown in Table 
6. The greatest departures from the expected distribution were the number of observed 
MQ-9 nanocodes used in Class B and Class C mishaps.  
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Table 6.   Mishaps by Class and Nanocode 
 
The dataset also was organized by Mishap Domain (Operations, 
Logistics/Maintenance, and Miscellaneous) in Table 7. The MQ-1 mishaps were 
identified as 31 (44.9 percent) Operations, 33 (47.8 percent) Logistics/Maintenance, and 
5 (7.2 percent) Miscellaneous. The MQ-9 mishaps were identified as 17 (89.5 percent) 
Operations, 2 (10.5 percent) Logistics/Maintenance, and 0 (0 percent) Miscellaneous. For 
both RPA types, the highest use of nanocodes was in the Operations domain with an 
average of 8.5 and 7.6 codes cited per mishap for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 respectively. The 
distribution of mishaps was analyzed and found to be statistically different across the two 
RPA types (χ 2(2) = 14.708, p = 0.001). In the logistic regression section, this 
polychotomous variable was coded with two dummy variables that used Operations as 
the baseline. 
Table 7.   Mishaps by Domain 
 
The dataset was further organized by mishap phase of flight (ground operations, 
take off, climb, enroute, landing, and other) as shown in Table 8. The MQ-1 mishaps 
were concentrated as 37 (53.6 percent) enroute and 24 (34.8 percent), landing. The MQ-9 
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mishap phases of flight were concentrated as 13 (68.4 percent) landing and 2 (10.5 
percent) enroute. The distribution of mishaps was analyzed and found to be statistically 
different across RPA type (χ 2(5) = 18.607, p = 0.002). The greatest departures from the 
expected were during the enroute and landing phases. 
Table 8.   Mishaps by Phase of Flight 
 
The mishap Phase of Flight was examined for statistical differences between RPA 
types (Table 9). The distribution of mishaps was found to be statistically different across 
Phase of Flight (χ 2(5) = 89.298, p = 0.000). Significant differences from a uniform 
distribution exist for every phase. In the logistic regression section, this polychotomous 
variable was coded with five dummy variables that used Landing as the baseline. 




B. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY 
A sample of 12 mishaps from the 88 in the database was randomly selected for 
validation and assessed for inter-rater reliability. The aerospace medicine specialist 
(Rater 2) and aerospace physiologist (Rater 3) conducted independent validations of the 
sample by reading each mishap report and coding each event adhering to the procedures 
specified by Webster, White, & Wurmstein (2005). The independent coding data from 
the random sample are located in Appendix B.  
1. HFACS Level I 
At Level I there was strong agreement across the categories Acts, Preconditions 
and Organization. There was partial agreement in the Supervision category. The primary 
locus of divergence was between Rater 1 (the original accident investigator) and Raters 2 
and 3 (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10.  Level I Inter-Rater Gauge Attribute Chart 
Cohen‟s Kappa was calculated for each pair of raters at Level I and is presented in 
Figure 11. The Kappa for Raters 2 and 3 indicates very good agreement (Cohen‟s Kappa 
= 1.00) at Level I. The level of agreement between Rater 1 and Raters 2 and 3 is only 
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moderate (Cohen‟s Kappa = 0.53). This lower agreement is likely attributable to Rater 1 
being a different individual during each mishap investigation. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Level I Inter-Rater Reliability Kappa Coefficients 
2. HFACS Level II 
At Level II there was improved percent agreement across the categories. There 
was little divergence across raters in any category (Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12.  Level II Inter-Rater Gauge Attribute Chart 
Cohen‟s Kappa was calculated for each pair of raters at Level II and is presented 
in Figure 13. On average, Level II agreement was stronger than at Level I. Agreement 
likely improved due to the larger data table used to calculate the Kappa coefficient and 
some divergence between Raters 2 and 3 at Level II. Agreement between Raters 1 and 2 
is considered Good (Cohen‟s Kappa = 0.67). Agreement between Raters 1 and 3 is 
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considered Moderate (Cohen‟s Kappa = 0.59). Agreement between Raters 2 and 3 is 
considered Very Good (Cohen‟s Kappa = 0.84). 
 
Figure 13.  Level II Inter-Rater Reliability Kappa Coefficients 
In sum, there was Moderate to Very Good agreement between the raters for the 
sample dataset of 12 mishaps. The Moderate to Good agreement between Rater 1 and 
Raters 2 and 3 provided sufficient evidence to support validation of the dataset. The 
remaining mishaps were therefore assumed to have been coded correctly by the accident 
investigators (Rater 1). As a result, the analysis of the data includes all 88 mishaps. 
C. HUMAN ERROR PATTERN ANALYSIS 
1. HFACS Level I Analysis 
Organization (76.8 percent) was cited more often than any other category and 
Supervision (37.7 percent) was cited the least with regard to the MQ-1 (Figure 14). Acts 
(84.2 percent) were cited more often than any other category and Supervision (47.4 
percent) was cited the least with regard to the MQ-9 (Figure 14). The null hypothesis 
states that the RPA type is equally likely to be cited as Acts (A), Preconditions (P), 
Supervision (S), or Organization (O). 
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Figure 14.  Level I HFACS Coding by RPA 
The mishap events are organized by Level I categories and are presented in Table 
10. The distribution of mishaps across category was not found to be statistically different 
(χ 2(3) = 2.581, p = 0.461). 
Table 10.   Level I Citing Frequency by RPA 
 
The mishap Level I categories were examined for statistical differences between 
both RPA types (Table 11). The distribution of mishaps was analyzed and found to be 
statistically different across DoD HFACS Level I categories (χ 2(3) = 9.633, p = 0.022). 
The number of observed mishaps that were cited as Supervision appears to differ from 
the expected values for that category.  
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Table 11.   Level I Citing Frequency (Both) 
 
2. HFACS Level II Analysis 
With regard to the MQ-1, Organizational Processes (60.9 percent) was cited more 
often than any other category and Violations (1.4 percent) and Physical Environment (1.4 
percent) were cited the least (Figure 15). With regard to the MQ-9, Skill Based Errors 
(63.2 percent) and Cognitive Factors (63.2 percent) were cited more often than any other 
category and Violations (0.0 percent), Physical Environment (0.0 percent), and Self-
Imposed Stress (0.0 percent) were cited the least with regard to the MQ-9 (Figure 15). 
The null hypothesis states that the RPA type is equally likely to be cited across the 20 
categories associated with Level II. 
 
Figure 15.  Level II HFACS Coding by RPA 
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The mishap events are organized by Level II categories and are presented in Table 
12. The distribution of mishaps across category was not found to be statistically different 
(χ 2(19) = 10.156, p = 0.949). 
Table 12.   Level II Citing Frequency by RPA 
 
The mishap Level II categories were examined for statistical differences between 
RPA types (Table 13). The distribution of mishaps was analyzed and found to be 
statistically different across DoD HFACS Level II categories (χ 2(19) = 216.198, p = 
0.000). Significant differences appear to exist between many of the counts of observed 
mishaps that were cited and the expected uniform frequency. 
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Table 13.   Level II Citing Frequency (Both) 
 
D. LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
In searching for potentially important covariates within the mishap reports, a 
univariate regression model for each category (Level I and II), Class, Domain, and Phase 
was completed. Factors with p-values less than 0.25 were deemed sufficiently significant 
to be included in subsequent iterations. Those with p-values greater than 0.25 are unlikely 
to be statistically significant in the subsequent logistic analysis and were safely discarded. 
The one exception was AE1 at Level II (p = 0.28), which was included due to its 
proximity to the 0.25 threshold. 
The logistic regression was applied at Levels I and II using dichotomously coded 
predictor variables (0 if absent, 1 if present) for the applicable category/nanocode at each 
level. Additional variables included in the analysis were Mishap Class, Mishap Domain, 
and Mishap Phase of Flight. Predictors with k levels were coded using k-1 dummy 
variables. The predicted response varies between zero and one from this perspective.  
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A stepwise regression was conducted in an effort to fit and select a feasible 
model. The minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was set as the stopping rule at 
both levels (Seagren C, Naval Postgraduate School. Personal communication, 2013). The 
Odds Ratios were calculated to measure the effect size and to describe the strength of 
association between the data. Model validation was completed using the ROC curve to 
show the tradeoff between successfully identifying True Positive values and mistakenly 
identifying False Positives. Cross-Validation was performed to assess how well the 
model classifies records outside of the data. Cross validation was executed by assigning 
training and test sets from the data. Due to the small size of the dataset, the model was 
cross validated twice at Level II to ensure that valid results were obtained for the dataset. 
The model was fit once with the test set excluded and once with the test set included. 
This two stage validation process provides a sense of the fit of the model. Contingency 
table analysis was conducted at each level to assess the misclassification rate. 
The categories AV, PE1, and PP2 were removed from the Level II logistic 
regression analysis due to the unstable nature of the small sample sizes.  
All logistic analysis tables and figures were built in JMP Pro10 statistical 
software. Cohen‟s Kappa, Chi-square, and binary logistic regression tests were used to 
identify human error patterns at Level I and II. The Nanocodes, Domain, and Phase were 
the predictor variables in the logistic regression analyses. Aircraft type, MQ-1 or MQ-9, 
was the binary response variable (MQ-1 = 1 and MQ-9 = 0). 
1. Covariate Analysis 
Three covariates - Class, Domain, and Phase - were analyzed for statistical 
differences using the chi-square test. A covariate analysis between the three covariates 
and both RPA types is summarized in Table 14. In evaluating the Mishap Class across 
both RPA types, the chi-square test resulted in a failure to reject Ho (p = 0.313) and was 
therefore safely discarded. In consideration of Mishap Domain (Logistics/Maintenance = 
1, Miscellaneous = 2, Operations = 3) across both RPA types, the logistic regression 
analysis coding of the dataset resulted in sufficient evidence to reject Ho (p = 0.001). 
Operations was selected as the baseline variable in the analysis. The Mishap Phase of 
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Flight (Ground Operations = 1, Takeoff = 2, Climb = 3, Enroute = 4, Landing = 6, Other 
= 7) across both RPA types was assessed, the logistic regression analysis coding of the 
dataset resulted in sufficient evidence to reject Ho (p = 0.001). Landing was selected as 
the baseline variable. (Note: There were no mishaps coded 5 in the study dataset). 
Table 14.   Summary of Covariate Chi-Square Tests 
 
2. Level I Analysis 
All four categories of Level I data were tested for homogeneity with regard to 
RPA type (Table 15). Acts and Organization met the defined threshold (p-values less than 
0.25), p = 0.059 and p = 0.045, respectively, while Preconditions and Supervision were 
discarded from the logistic analysis because their p-values exceed the threshold. 
Table 15.   Summary of Level I Mishap Distribution 
 
Stepwise logistic regression was run with the four Level I factors found to be 
statistically significant: Acts, Organization, Domain, and Phase. The baselines for 
Domain and Phase were Operations and Landing respectively. The stopping rule for this 
fit was defined by minimum AIC. The model identifies (Figure 16) Domain 
(Logistics/Maintenance), Phase (Ground Operations), and Phase (Enroute) as parameters 
to include in the logistic model. 
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Figure 16.  Level I Stepwise Fit Results for RPA 
A nominal logistic model was fit to the data identified by the stepwise regression 
(Figure 17). The Whole Model Test reveals that there was statistically significant 
evidence to suggest that the model is useful in differentiating between RPA type (χ 2(3) = 
19.9, p = 0.000). The Lack of Fit test suggests there was little evidence to support a lack 
of fit with the selected model (p = .112). Phase (Enroute) was identified as the most 
statistically significant parameter (p = .052) in the model. The resulting model for Level I 
is: 
ˆlogit(p) 1.08 .80( / ) 1.08( ) .81( )Log Mx GroundOps Enroute     
This model implies that Logistics/Maintenance, and Enroute related RPA mishaps 
are associated with MQ-1 mishaps, and Ground Operations related mishaps are 
associated with MQ-9 mishaps. 
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Figure 17.  Level I Nominal Logistic Fit for RPA 
The Odds Ratios (Figure 18) summarize the effect size and to describe the 
strength of association between the data. The Odds Ratio for Domain 
(Logistics/Maintenance) is 4.93. Logistics/Maintenance related RPA mishaps are 
associated with greater likelihood of an MQ-1 mishap relative to an MQ-9 mishap. The 
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Odds Ratio for Phase (Ground Operations) is 8.73. Ground Operations related mishaps 
are associated with greater likelihood of an MQ-9 mishap relative to an MQ-1 mishap. 
The Odds Ratio for Phase (Enroute) is 4.99. Enroute related mishaps are associated with 
greater likelihood of an MQ-1 mishap relative to an MQ-9 mishap. 
 
Figure 18.  Level I Odds Ratio Results 
The ROC curve identified the tradeoffs between successfully identifying True 
Positive values and mistakenly identifying False Positives. The resulting ROC curve 
value for the dataset at Level I was .797 (Figure 19) which suggests that the model may 
have some trouble with misclassification. 
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Figure 19.  Level I ROC Curve 
3. Level I Cross Validation 
Cross-Validation was performed to assess how well the model classifies records 
outside of the data. Cross validation was executed by assigning a training set (n = 72) and 
a test set (n = 16) from the data. The analysis from the training set (Figure 20) shows that 
the model misclassified 14 of the 72 mishaps (19.4 percent). The results; however, further 
indicate the fit of the model is strong for predicting MQ-1 mishaps (98.3 percent) and 
relatively weak for predicting MQ-9 mishaps (13.3 percent). 
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Figure 20.  Level I Cross Validation Training Set Results 
The test set (Figure 21) produced similar results by misclassifying three of 16 
mishaps (18.8 percent). The MQ-1 was accurately predicted 12 out of 12 times (100 
percent) and the MQ-9 was accurately predicted one out of four times (25.0 percent). The 
similar misclassification rates indicate agreement between the test and training sets. 
Additionally, it can be noted that the model is much more efficient at accurately 
predicting MQ-1 mishaps relative to MQ-9 mishaps. 
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Figure 21.  Level I Cross Validation Test Set Results 
4. Level II Analysis 
Of the 20 DoD HFACS categories at Level II, 17 were tested for homogeneity 
with regard to RPA type. The categories AV (Violations), PE1 (Physical Environment), 
and PP2 (Self-Imposed Stress) were removed from the logistic regression due to small 
sample size and associated numerical instability. AE1 (Skill-Based Errors), AE3 
(Perception Errors), PC1 (Cognitive Factors), OC (Organizational Climate), and OP 
(Organizational Processes) met the defined threshold. AE1 (p = 0.28), was the one 
exception which was included due to its approximate value of 0.25. 
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Table 16.   Summary of Level II Mishap Distribution 
 
Factors found to be significant in the stepwise regression were included in the 
logistic analysis: AE1 (Skill-Based Errors), AE3 (Perception Errors), PC1 (Cognitive 
Factors), OC (Organizational Climate), and OP (Organizational Processes). The baselines 
for Domain and Phase randomly chosen were Operations and Landing respectively. The 
stopping rule for this fit was defined by minimum AIC. The model identified OC 
(Organizational Climate), Domain (Logistics/Maintenance), Phase (Ground Ops), and 




Figure 22.  Level II Stepwise Fit Results for RPA  
A nominal logistic model was fit to the data identified by the stepwise regression. 
The Whole Model Test reveals that there is statistically significant evidence to suggest 
that the model is useful in differentiating between RPA type (χ 2(4) = 22.3, p = 0.0002) 
The Lack of Fit test suggests there is little evidence to support a lack of fit with the 
selected model (p = .19). Phase (Enroute) was identified as the most statistically 
significant parameter (p = .04). The resulting model for Level II is: 
ˆlogit(p) 0.642 0.581( ) 0.684( / ) 1.163( ) 0.898( )OC Log Mx GroundOps Enroute    
 
This model implies that Logistics/Maintenance, and Enroute related RPA mishaps 
are associated with MQ-1 mishaps, whereas Ground Operations and Organizational 




Figure 23.  Level II Nominal Logistic Fit for RPA 
The Odds Ratios (Figure 24) summarize the effect size and to describe the 
strength of association between the data.  The Odds Ratio for OC (Organizational 
Culture) is 3.20. Organizational Culture related RPA mishaps are associated with greater 
likelihood of an MQ-9 mishap. Domain (Logistics/Maintenance) is 3.92. 
Logistics/Maintenance related RPA mishaps are associated with greater likelihood of an 
MQ-1 mishap relative to an MQ-9 mishap. The Odds Ratio for Phase (Ground 
Operations) is 10.23. Ground Operations related mishaps are associated with greater 
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likelihood of an MQ-9 mishap relative to an MQ-1 mishap. The Odds Ratio for Phase 
(Enroute) is 6.02. Enroute related mishaps are associated with greater likelihood of an 
MQ-1 mishap relative to an MQ-9 mishap. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Level II Odds Ratio Results 
The ROC curve identified the tradeoffs between successfully identifying True 
Positive values and mistakenly identifying False Positives. The resulting ROC curve 
value for the dataset at Level II was .823 (Figure 25). The value indicates that the model 
may have some trouble with misclassification. 
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Figure 25.  Level II ROC Curve 
5. Level II Cross Validation 
Cross-Validation was performed to assess how well the Level II model classifies 
records outside of the data. Cross validation was executed by assigning a training set (n = 
75) and a test set (n = 13) from the data. The analysis from the training set (Figure 26) 
shows that the model misclassified 13 of the 72 mishaps (18.1 percent); however, the 
results further indicate the fit of the model is strong for predicting MQ-1s (93.3 percent) 
and relatively weak for predicting MQ-9s (40.0 percent). 
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Figure 26.  Level II Cross Validation Training Set Results 
The test set (Figure 27) produced similar results by misclassifying three of 13 
mishaps (23.7 percent). The MQ-1 was accurately predicted nine out of nine times (100 
percent) and the MQ-9 was accurately predicted only once out of four times (25 percent). 
The similar misclassification rates indicate agreement between the test and training sets. 
Additionally, it can be noted that the model is much more efficient at accurately 
predicting MQ-1 mishaps relative to MQ-9 mishaps. These results are consistent with the 
Level I Cross Validation.  
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Figure 27.  Level II Cross Validation Test Set Results 
A second Cross-Validation was performed to further assess how well the model 
classifies records outside of the data at Level II. Cross validation was executed by 
assigning a training set (n = 76) and a test set (n = 12) from the data. The analysis from 
the second training set (Figure 28) shows that the model misclassified 15 of the 76 
mishaps (19.7 percent); however, the results further indicate the fit of the model is strong 




Figure 28.  Level II Cross Validation Training Set Results (Second Iteration) 
The second test set (Figure 29) produced similar results by misclassifying three of 
12 mishaps for a rate of 25.0 percent. The MQ-1 was accurately predicted eight out of 
eight times (100 percent) and the MQ-9 was accurately predicted one out of four times 
(25.0 percent). The similar misclassification rates indicate agreement between the test 
and training sets. Additionally, it can be noted again that the model is much more 
efficient at accurately predicting MQ-1 mishaps relative to MQ-9 mishaps. These results 
are consistent with the Level I Cross Validation and the first Level II Cross Validation. 
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Figure 29.  Level II Cross Validation Test Set Results (Second Iteration) 
E. SUMMARY 
The application of a chi-square analysis to evaluate the observed and expected 
frequencies at both Levels for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 provided statistical rationale for 
selecting nanocodes and covariates for inclusion in the logistic regression. 
The HFACS Level I results of the logistic regression included only the two 
covariates, Domain and Phase, as qualified parameters in the construction of the model to 
predict RPA type. The analysis at Level I did not identify any latent or active failures, as 
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defined in DoD HFACS, for inclusion in the model. The analysis at this level suggests 
that the binary response variable (RPA type) was not associated with human error (DoD 
HFACS). The analyses fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is not an effect on RPA 
type on human performance concerns while operating RPA systems with the same GCS. 
The Level II results of the logistic regression are consistent with the results from 
Level I. The model included only one nanocode group, Organizational Culture, and the 
same two Level I covariates, Domain and Phase, to predict mishap RPA type. The 
analysis only identified one latent failure and no active failures, as defined in DoD 
HFACS, for inclusion in the model. The hypothesis that there is not an effect on RPA 
type on human performance concerns while operating RPA systems with the same GCS 
cannot be rejected. 
The near exclusion of the DoD HFACS nanocodes as variables in either model 
indicates that there is not sufficient human error evidence in this dataset to suggest that 
there is a relative difference in probability favoring the MQ-1 or MQ-9 mishap 
predictability based on the use of the same GCS. 
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As the effort to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of RPA systems 
continues, there is an increasing demand for improved total system performance; 
specifically reduced mishap rates. Based on the dramatic increase in Combatant 
Commander‟s requests for these mission critical systems during the last decade, in 
addition to the rapidly growing civilian RPA sector, it is evident these systems are 
becoming an integral component to our national defense and numerous civil aeronautics 
sectors. Results from a recent study of 221 DoD RPA mishaps spanning a 10-year period 
found that 79 percent of USAF RPA mishaps were human error-related (Tvaryanas, 
2006). The analysis and understanding of where human error can be attributed in this 
realm is lacking in the current literature. In an effort to improve the understanding of 
RPA mishap epidemiology, an analysis was completed on USAF MQ-1 and MQ-9 RPA 
mishaps from 20062011. The dataset included 88 human error-related mishaps that were 
coded using DoD HFACS, an evolution of Reason‟s complex linear accident model, 
known as the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1990). 
The human error coding assigned by the mishap investigators was validated by 
conducting inter-rater reliability analyses. The moderate to good agreement identified 
between Rater 1 (original mishap investigator) and Raters 2 (aerospace medicine 
specialist) and 3 (aerospace physiologist) provided sufficient evidence to support 
validation of the study dataset. 
The initial exploration of the data involved the organization of the data into two 
levels of the DoD HFACS hierarchy, Level I (Acts, Preconditions, Supervision, 
Organization) and Level II (20 subcategories of Level I). Covariates evaluated in the 
dataset included Phase of Flight (Ground Operations, Takeoff, Climb, Enroute, Landing, 
and Other), Mishap Domain (Operations, Logistics/Maintenance, and Miscellaneous), 
and Mishap Class (A, B, and C) by RPA type. The application of a chi-square analysis at 
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both Levels for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 identified Mishap Domain and Phase of flight to be 
statistically significant for inclusion as covariates in the logistic regression analysis. 
The subsequent analysis applied a series of chi-square tests to identify statistical 
differences among the HFACS categories (at both levels) by RPA type. The application 
of the chi-square analysis to evaluate the observed and expected frequencies at both 
Levels for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 provided statistical rationale for selecting nanocodes and 
covariates for inclusion in the logistic regression. The resulting statistically significant (p-
value < 0.25) categories and covariates were further analyzed by applying logistic 
regression techniques to the data. The resulting logistic regression models are designed to 
predict aircraft type within the mishap dataset. The models were assessed using ROC 
curves for accuracy and were cross validated using test sets from the study dataset. The 
models intend to provide quantitative data to inform RPA certification standards and to 
complement existing efforts to improve future system designs. 
The Level I results of the logistic regression included only the two covariates, 
Domain and Phase, as qualified parameters in the construction of the model to predict 
RPA type. The analysis at Level I did not identify any latent or active failures, as defined 
in DoD HFACS, for inclusion in the model. The analysis at this level suggests that the 
binary response variable (RPA type) was not associated with human error (DoD 
HFACS). The analyses fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is not an effect on RPA 
type on human performance concerns while operating RPA systems with the same GCS. 
The Level II results of the logistic regression are consistent with the results from 
Level I. The model included only one DoD HFACS category, Organizational Climate, 
and the same two Level I covariates, Domain and Phase, to predict mishap RPA type. 
The hypothesis that there is not an effect on RPA type on human performance concerns 
while operating RPA systems with the same GCS cannot be rejected. 
The near exclusion of the DoD HFACS nanocodes as variables in either model 
indicates that there may not be sufficient human error evidence in this dataset to suggest 
that there is a relative difference in MQ-1 or MQ-9 mishap predictability based on the use 
of the same GCS. 
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The adequate incorporation of Human Systems Integration early in the system 
acquisition phases is dependent on quantitative and relevant data to serve as forcing 
functions in designing and building smart human-centered systems. The models derived 
in this study support performance improvement by quantifying mishap patterns and how 
those patterns resemble or differ between the MQ-1 and MQ-9 when operated with the 
same GCS. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research was driven by the need to improve the understanding of human 
error patterns in the RPA operations realm. The specific research question was: Do the 
types of active failures (unsafe acts) and latent failures (preconditions, unsafe 
supervision, and organizational influences) differ between the MQ-1 and MQ-9 when 
operated with the same GCS? The single inclusion of Organizational Climate 
(organizational influence) in the Level II model suggests that there is not a statistically 
significant difference in RPA type mishaps with regard to human error. 
The research analyzed the archive of HFACS data in addition to covariates such 
as Mishap Class, Mishap Domain, and Mishap Phase of Flight that are unique to each 
aircraft and those that are shared by both to identify potential human error patterns. It 
developed logistic regression models to predict aircraft type given the mishap dataset. 
The Level I Model is defined as: 
ˆlogit(p) 1.08 .80( / ) 1.08( ) .81( )Log Mx GroundOps Enroute     
This model predicts that the specific Domain of the mishap in addition to the 
Phase of Flight in which the mishap occurred accurately predicts RPA type 
approximately 79 percent of the time within the dataset. Specifically, 
Logistics/Maintenance related RPA mishaps are associated with greater likelihood of an 
MQ-1 mishap relative to an MQ-9 mishap. Ground Operations related mishaps are 
associated with greater likelihood of an MQ-9 mishap relative to an MQ-1 mishap. 
Enroute related mishaps are associated with greater likelihood of an MQ-1 mishap 
relative to an MQ-9 mishap. There were no Level I (Acts, Preconditions, Supervision, 
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Organization) DoD HFACS identified in the analysis that were considered statistically 
different by chi-square and logistic regression for inclusion in the model. These results 
suggest that human performance requirements need to be closely coupled to the GCS and 
not necessarily RPA type. 
The Level II Model is defined as: 
ˆlogit(p) 0.642 0.581( ) 0.684( / ) 1.163( ) 0.898( )OC Log Mx GroundOps Enroute      
This model predicts that the citing of the Level II DoD HFACS category (latent 
failure), Organizational Climate, is more strongly associated with MQ-9 mishaps. 
Additionally, the specific Domain of the mishap in addition to the Phase of Flight in 
which the mishap occurred accurately predicts RPA type approximately 82 percent of the 
time within the dataset. The covariate results are consistent with the Level I model. There 
was only one Level II DoD HFACS category, Organizational Climate (latent failure), 
identified in the analysis that was considered sufficiently diagnostic by chi-square and 
logistic regression for inclusion in the model. These results provide additional evidence 
that human performance requirements need to be closely coupled to the GCS and not 
necessarily to the RPA type. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEM DESIGN 
RPA provide a unique challenge to developers of certification standards (e.g., 
FAA, DoD) because the GCS and the aircraft are separate and it is theoretically possible 
to mix and match GCSs and aircraft. The stated research question was, “what matters in 
terms of human performance: the GCS or the aircraft?” The dataset provided the 
opportunity to gain insight into this question as a natural experiment in which the cockpit 
(GCS) is controlled and the aircraft was varied. The study results suggest that the GCS is 
what matters in terms of human performance, not the aircraft. The unique patterns, or 
lack thereof, of human performance failures provide evidence supporting the 
development of GCS standards used in RPA systems. The author recognizes that further 
exploration and analysis must be accomplished to transition to a more comprehensive 
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understanding of RPA mishap patterns. The efforts presented in this study have 
contributed to the understanding this relatively new realm in aviation history, the RPA. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This study explored the potential human error patterns in the USAF MQ-1 and 
MQ-9 communities, and recommends a solution aimed at proactive mishap prevention. 
Only a single RPA-specific human error pattern was identified to be significant enough 
for inclusion in the models, organizational climate (latent failure). The identified 
covariates in the models provide valuable data supporting further exploration into 
improved safety approaches with the potential to reduce costly RPA accidents. The study 
hypothesis that there is an effect of aircraft type on the human performance challenges 
when operating an RPA system from the same GCS was rejected. Current and future 
RPA systems should consider and prioritize the impact of GCS design with regard to 
RPA total system performance. 
The USAF should consider additional human error research on current and future 
weapon systems currently in the acquisitions process. The suggested research should not 
be limited to historical mishap data, but should include areas where latent conditions can 
be quantified as both positive and negative drivers in total system performance. These 
areas should focus on the design of the GCS. The scope of this study did not include the 
specific issues with regard to the GCS, nor did it investigate the characteristics of the 
GCS and any potential influence on human error-related RPA mishaps. It is therefore 
recommended that future research and development efforts focus on the specific 
parameters surrounding the design and function of the GCS. The data analysis at the 
beginning of Chapter 4 is a recommended starting point for potential human error 
analysis as related to the GCS. The statistically significant differences prevalent among 
both levels of DoD HFACS categories (Table 13) may provide a starting point for further 
analysis that was outside the scope of this project. By using the analysis in this research, 
the USAF may be able to develop effective system design strategies with the objective to 
reduce the growing cost of human error RPA mishaps. 
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Primary Function Armed reconnaissance, airborne 
surveillance and target acquisition
Remotely piloted hunter/killer weapon 
system
Contractor General Atomics Aeronautical Systems 
Inc.
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, 
Inc.
Power Plant Rotax 914F four cylinder engine Honeywell TPE331-10GD turboprop 
engine
Thrust 115 horsepower 900 shaft horsepower maximum
Wingspan 55 feet (16.8 meters) 66 feet (20.1 meters)
Length 27 feet (8.22 meters) 36 feet (11 meters)
Height 6.9 feet (2.1 meters) 12.5 feet (3.8 meters)
Weight 1,130 pounds ( 512 kilograms) empty 4,900 pounds (2,223 kilograms) empty
Maximum takeoff weight 2,250 pounds (1,020 kilograms) 10,500 pounds (4,760 kilograms)
Fuel Capacity 665 pounds (100 gallons) 4,000 pounds (602 gallons)
Payload 450 pounds (204 kilograms) 3,750 pounds (1,701 kilograms)
Speed Cruise speed around 84 mph (70 knots), 
up to 135 mph
Cruise speed around 230 miles per hour 
(200 knots)
Range Up to 770 miles (675 nautical miles) 1,150 miles (1,000 nautical miles)
Ceiling Up to 25,000 feet (7,620 meters) Up to 50,000 feet (15,240 meters)
Armament Two laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire 
missiles 
Combination of AGM-114 Hellfire 
missiles, GBU-12 Paveway II and GBU-
38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions
Crew (remote) Two (pilot and sensor operator) Two (pilot and sensor operator)
Initial operational capability Mar-05 Oct-07
Unit Cost $20 million (FY09$M) (includes four 
aircraft, a GCS and a Primary Satellite 
Link)
$53.5 million (includes four aircraft with 
sensors) (fiscal 2006 dollars)
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